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BROWN V. SUPERIOR COURT: DRUG 
MANUFACTURERS GET IMMUNIZED FROM 
STRICT LIABILITY FOR DESIGN DEFECTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Brown v. Superior Courtl the California Supreme Court 
held that a drug manufacturer cannot be held strictly liable for 
harm caused by a prescription drug. In doing so, the court pur-
ported to adopt comment k of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
SECTION 402A2 (hereinafter comment k), but interpreted the 
••• 
1. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988). 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea· 
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property 
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer or to his property, if (a) the seller is 
engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is 
expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub· 
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The 
rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has 
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any contractual relation with the 
seller . 
comment k 
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products 
which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite in· 
capable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary 
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An 
outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment 
of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and 
damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease 
itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing 
and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding 
the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a 
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper direc-
tions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dan-
gerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and 
the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be 
sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physi-
cian. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental 
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for 
435 
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comment as providing a blanket immunity from strict liability 
for design defects of prescription drugs. 
The court's decision gives prescription drug manufacturers 
broad protection against liability. A consumer injured due to the 
defective condition of a prescription drug must now prove negli-
gence or failure to warn of a known risk. 
The Brown decision resulted from a suit filed by 69 women 
against numerous drug manufacturers who allegedly produced 
DES,S a substance ingested by the plaintiffs' mothers to prevent 
miscarriage. They alleged that DES was defective and caused 
them injury in utero:' The court's ruling will impact both men 
and women as consumers of prescription drugs. However, the 
decision has several ramifications which will impact specifically 
on womens' health. First, it appears that women have suffered 
the greatest ill-effects from their mothers' ingestion of DES.II 
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of 
safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such expe-
rience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug 
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of 
such products, again with the qualification that they are prop-
erly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, 
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liabil-
ity for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely 
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an ap-
parently useful and desirable product, attended with a known 
but apparently reasonable risk. 
3. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is a synthetic substance which duplicates the activity of 
estrogen, a female sex hormone. In 1947, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) au-
thorized the marketing of DES as a miscarriage preventative on an experimental basis. 
DES was made or distributed by 267 drug companies. The drug companies were all able 
to produce the drug because it was an unpatented generic product. By the mid-1950's 
studies had been conducted showing that DES did not prevent miscarriages. However, 
the drug remained on the market. In 1971, several physicians published an article associ-
ating DES with a rare form of vaginal cancer in young girls born to women who had 
taken the drug during pregnancy. The cancer, clear-cell adenocarcinoma, had previously 
been seen only in much older women. R. MEYERS, DES, THE BJ'ITER PILL 17-19 (1983). In 
1971, the FDA ordered that DES not be marketed or promoted for the purpose of 
preventing miscarriages. Sindell v. Abott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 
C)l. Rptr. 132 (1980). 
For a detailed history and information on DES, see D. FINK, DES TASK FORCE SUM-
MARY REPORT, (DHEW, PUB. No. (NIH) 84-1688 1978). 
4. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1054-1055, 751 P.2d 470, 473, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 412, 414 (1988). 
5. Some research has indicated that there is a slightly higher frequency of certain 
genital abnormalities among DES sons. Some examples include undescended testes, hy-
poplastic testes, epididymal cysts, and low or abnormal sperm counts. D. FINK, DES 
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Second, some prescription drugs such as birth control pills and 
pregnancy medications are designed and marketed specifically 
for women. In light of the Brown decision, women using these 
types of prescription drugs will be prohibited from bringing a 
strict liability action if a drug is defectively designed. Finally, if 
this decision reflects a trend by a new and more conservative 
California Supreme Court,6 it may have an even greater impact 
on women. In Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation7 the 
California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District held that an 
IUD (a prescription device) was exempt from strict liability de-
sign defect analysis. The Collins court stated, "[w]hen the prod-
uct which allegedly caused a plaintiff's injury is a prescription 
product, which is distributed with the approval of the FDA pro-
vided the manufacturer accompany the product with warnings 
of foreseeable risks, we conclude the product must be considered 
unavoidably unsafe as a matter of law and thus outside the pa-
rameters of strict liability for defective design."8 The California 
Supreme Court initially granted Collins review prior to its deci-
sion in Brown.S Subsequent to Brown, however, the California 
Supreme Court dismissed and remanded Collins back to the 
court of appeals. 10 If other appellate courts follow the Collins 
TASK FORCE SUMMARY REPORT, (DHEW, PUB. No. (NIH) 53844403 23 (1985)). There is 
no evidence yet of any increased risk of cancer of the testes, prostate or other sites 
among DES sons. D. FINK, DES TASK FORCE SUMMARY REPORT, (DHEW, PUB. No. (NIH) 
84-1688 65 (1978)). 
6. For the first time in California's history, voters decided in November 1986 not to 
retain sitting justices-Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird, Associate Justice Cruz Rey-
noso, and Associate Justice Joseph Grodin. Much of the campaign against them was 
fought on the death penalty issue, but the court's tort decisions were also attacked. 
Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 338 (1987). 
7. Review granted, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1194, 732 P.2d 542, 234 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1987), 
dismissed 761 P.2d 102, 251 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1988). Plaintiff suffered uterine problems 
that ultimately resulted in a hysterectomy. The problems were allegedly caused by an 
intrauterine (IUD) birth control device. 
8. Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1539, 1551, 231 Cal. 
Rptr. 396, 404 (1986). 
9. Collins was granted review Feb. 26, 1987. Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 
186 Cal. App. 3d 1194, 732 P.2d 542, 234 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1987). Brown was decided April 
1, 1988. 
10. Collins, 761 P.2d 102, 251 Cal. Rptr. 642. The court dismissed the review pursu-
ant to Rule 29.4(c) of California Rules of Court. Rule 29.4(c) states in part: 
"[Dismissal of review) The Supreme Court may dismiss review 
of a cause as improvidently granted and remand the cause to 
the Court of Appeal." 
If the Supreme Court dismisses review as improvidently granted under subdivision (c), 
the cause is restored to the posture it had before the Supreme Court granted review: the 
decision of the Court of Appeal is final. CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT 29.4(c) Advisory 
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rationale, women injured due to defectively designed prescrip-
tion devices (e.g. prescription contraceptive devices) will be pre-
cluded from proceeding on a strict liability design defect theory. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The plaintiffs in Brown sought recovery on theories of strict 
liability for design defect, failure to warn, breach of express and 
implied warranty, fraud and negligence,u The California Su-
preme Court granted review to examine the conclusions of the 
court of appeals and its potential conflict with Kearl v. Lederle 
Laboratories12 on the issue of strict liability of a drug manufac-
turer for a defect in the design of a prescription drug.13 
The Kearl court disapproved the "rather routine and 
mechanical fashion by which many appellate courts have con-
cluded that certain products, particularly drugs," are exempted 
from strict products liability.14 That court held that the decision 
as to whether a drug, vaccine, or any other product is entitled to 
exemption from strict liability design defect analysis as an un-
avoidably unsafe product is a mixed question of law and fact. A 
trial court should take evidence as to: (1) whether, when distrib-
uted, the product was intended to confer an exceptionally im-
portant benefit that made its availability highly desirable; (2) 
whether the then-existing risk posed by the product both was 
"substantial" and "unavoidable";ll1 and (3) whether the interest 
in availability (measured as of the time of distribution) out-
weighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability 
through strict liability design defect review. If these factors ex-
Committee's comment. 
11. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1055-1056, 751 P.2d 470, 473, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 412, 414-415 (1988). 
12. 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985). 
13. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1055-1056, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. 415. 
14. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 
(1985). 
15. One commentator has suggested that courts should weigh the risks which exist 
at the time of trial. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the 
Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 570-571 (1969). The 
rationale is that the fact-finding task in determining whether a risk is knowable is often 
impossible, especially when drugs are involved. The outcome "depends too much on the 
competency and skill of the advocates and investigators." [d. at 570. However, this is too 
great a burden to place on manufacturers as they should not be required to be clairvoy-
ant. Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 337-338, 732 P.2d 297, 306-307 (1987). 
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ist, the product will be deemed unavoidably dangerous and ex-
empted from strict products liability design defect analysis. IS 
The Brown court rejected that portion of Kearl17 which held 
that not all prescription drugs should be exempt from strict lia-
bility design defect analysis. IS This note analyzes only that por-
tion of the Brown decision relating to design defectsl9 in pre-
scription drugs.2o 
III. THE COURT'S REASONING 
A. PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AS COMPARED TO OTHER PRODUCTS 
The Brown court attempted to distinguish prescription 
drugs from other products. 
In the latter cases [other products], the product is 
used to make work easier or to provide pleasure, 
while in the former [prescription drugs] it may be 
necessary to alleviate pain and suffering or to sus-
tain life. Moreover, unlike other important medi-
cal products (wheelchairs, for example), harm 
to some users from prescription drugs IS 
unavoidable. 21 
Once the court determined there was a distinction between pre-
scription drugs and other products, it then balanced the public 
policies mitigating for and against imposition of strict liability 
for design defects of prescription drugs. 
16. Kearl, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 829-830, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463-464. 
17. 172 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463 (1984). 
18. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1068-1069,751 P.2d 470, 482, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 412, 424 (1988). 
19. Two alternative tests have been adopted by the California Supreme Court by 
which to measure design defects. First, whether the product performed as safely as the 
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended and reasonably foreseeable 
manner. Second, whether the benefits of the challenged design outweighed the risk of 
danger inherent in the design. This second test is know as the risk/benefit analysis. 
Barker v. Lull Engineering, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 
225, 237-238 (1978). 
20. The Brown Court also dealt with the issues of failure to warn, fraud, breach of 
express and implied warranty, and whether the liability imposed on drug manufacturers 
in DES cases should be joint and several. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1065-1066 and 1069-1075, 
751 P.2d at 477-478 and 483-487, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421-422 and 424-428. 
21. [d. at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420. 
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B. COMPETING PUBLIC POLICIES 
1. Public Policies Favoring Strict Liability for Design Defects 
in Prescription Drugs 
The California Supreme Court first held a manufacturer 
strictly liable in tort in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 
Inc. 22 In that landmark decision, Justice Traynor stated the pur-
pose of strict liability is to impose the cost of injuries on manu-
facturers who market the product rather than on "injured per-
sons who are powerless to protect themselves."23 
In addition to the public policy of placing the responsibility 
of a defective product on the manufacturer, the goals of risk re-
duction and risk distribution also underlay the imposition of 
strict liability. Risk reduction operates on the premise that man-
ufacturers will work to make their products safer if they are lia-
ble for defective products.24 Risk distribution spreads the cost of 
injury from those who are harmed by a defective product to con-
sumers of the product who will pay a higher price to reflect the 
increased cost of insurance to the manufacturer.211 The Brown 
court accepted that "[t]hese reasons could justify application of 
the doctrine to the manufacturers of prescription drugs."26 How-
ever, because the court determined that prescription drugs are 
distinct from other products it proceeded to evaluate counter 
policy considerations.27 
2. Public Policies Opposing Strict Liability for Design Defects 
in Prescription Drugs 
The Brown court espoused three public policies mitigating 
22. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 58-59, 377 P.2d 897, 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 698 (1963). Plaintiff 
was injured by the defective design of a power tool. The court held that a manufacturer 
is strictly liable in tort when an article it places on the market, knowing the article is to 
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to some 
human being. 
23. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. 
24. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1062, 751 P.2d 470, 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. 
412, 419-420 (1988). 
25. Id. at 1062-1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 419-420. 
26. Id. at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420. 
27. Id. at 44 Cal. 3d at 1063-1065, 751 P.2d at 478-480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420-421. 
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against imposing strict liability for prescription drugs.28 First, 
the court was concerned that drug manufacturers might stop 
producing valuable drugs because of lost profits resulting from 
lawsuits or the inability to obtain adequate insurance.29 
Second, there is a consumer interest in getting new drugs on 
the market as ~uickly as possible. Imposition of strict liability 
might cause manufacturers to delay in putting new products on 
the market.30 
Finally, the added expense of insuring against strict liability 
and additional research programs might cause the cost of medi-
cation to increase in price so that it would no longer be afforda-
ble to consumers.31 
These policy considerations prompted the court to adopt 
comment k and to interpret it as providing drug manufacturers 
blanket immunity from strict liability for design defects.32 
C. COMMENT K OF RESTATEMENT (SECOND) SECTION 402A 
Comment k creates an exception to the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS SECTION 402A for products which are "unavoid-
ably unsafe" and should, therefore, not be subject to strict liabil-
ity.33 For over two decades, courts have almost universally 
concluded that some special products should not be subjected to 
design defect analysis.34 The Brown court conceded that the lan-
guage of comment k is unclear as to whether it should be inter-
preted as granting prescription drugs blanket immunity from 
strict liability.31i However, the court chose to interpret the com-
ment as exempting all prescription drugs from design defect 
analysis stating, "we are of the view that the comment was in-
tended to and should apply to all prescription drugs. "36 
28. Id. at 1063·1065, 751 P.2d at 478·480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420·421. 
29. Id. at 44 Cal. 3d at 1063·1065, 751 P.2d at 479·480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420·421. 
30. Id. at 44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 1061, 751 P.2d at 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418 (1988). 
33. See supra, note 2. 
34. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 825, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 460· 
461 (1985). 
35. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069, n.ll, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424. 
36.Id. 
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The court gave two reasons for this interpretation and ap-
plication of comment k. First, it stated that "almost all jurisdic-
tions that have adopted the rule stated in the comment view its 
provisions as granting immunity from strict liability to all such 
drugs."37 Second, the court contended that granting drug manu-
facturers any protection short of blanket immunity from strict 
liability would result in valuable drugs being withheld from con-
sumers. The court believed that the public interest in developing 
and marketing new drugs would be substantially impaired by 
the very process of attempting to distinguish which drugs should 
receive the protection of comment k because drug manufacturers 
would have no assurance as to whether a product placed on the 
market will be measured by the liability standard of comment k 
or a stricter standard.3s "In order to vindicate the public's inter-
est in the availability and affordability of prescription drugs, a 
manufacturer must have a greater assurance that his products 
will not be measured by a strict liability standard than is pro-
vided by the test stated in Kearl."39 
The Brown court conceded that "[i]t seems unjust to grant 
the same protection from liability to those who gave us 
thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin. "40 However, the 
court permitted other policies to override this injustice, and 
therefore rejected the test set forth in Kearl which would deter-
mine if a prescription drug is entitled to comment k protection. 
It is the opinion of this author that the Brown court errone-
ously allowed its concern for the availability and affordability of 
prescription drugs to completely overshadow other important 
public policy concerns favoring strict liability. This Note pro-
poses that the availability and affordability of prescription drugs 
could have been properly balanced with the need to protect in-
nocent consumers by following the test set forth in Kearl u. Led-
erle Laboratories. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 1067-1068, 751 P.2d at 481-482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423-424. 
39. Id. at 1068, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424. The Brown court also gave 
other reasons for its rejection of the Kearl test but those seemed secondary to the rea-
sons discussed here. For a response to these other reasons, see Toner v. Lederle Labora-
tories, 112 Idaho at 328, 340 n.10, 732 P.2d 297, 309 (1987). 
40. Id. at 1067, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423. 
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IV. CRITIQUE 
A. EFFECTS OF BROWN DECISION 
The California Supreme Court's decision will often result in 
leaving a victim who is harmed by a defective drug without rem-
edy. This unfortunate consequence will hold true regardless of 
how catastrophic the harm or how ineffective or unnecessary the 
drug. Although the victim can pursue a negligence cause of ac-
tion, the hurdle is greater since the plaintiff must carry the evi-
dentiary burden.41 In the case of a drug manufacturer, a plaintiff 
may have a particularly difficult burden of proof. "The time and 
expense required to investigate all the procedures of those who 
make and sell a new drug is enormous, and may prevent an indi-
vidual litigant from gathering the necessary facts to prove negli-
gence when it does, in fact, occur."42 
B. BROWNS DISTINCTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
The distinctions made by the Brown court between pre-
scription drugs and other products43 are artificial. The distinc-
tion between products which make work easier or provide pleas-
ure and prescription drugs which may be necessary to alleviate 
pain does not always hold true. For example, not all prescription 
drugs are intended to alleviate pain and suffering but fall more 
within the "providing pleasure" category. (e.g. minoxidol pro-
motes hair growthH and Retin-A tightens wrinkles.45) As tech-
nology develops and knowledge increases, it is reasonable to ex-
pect an increase in prescription drugs which are cosmetic and 
would fit more within the "providing pleasure" classification. 
Also, strict liability applies to other products (non-prescription 
drugs) which alleviate pain and suffering. (e.g. arm and leg con-
trol devices enabling handicapped individuals to drive automo-
biles). The court's explanation for these differing standards was 
41. The burden of proof of the defendant's negligence is on the plaintiff. W. PAGE 
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, P 139 (5th ed. 1984). 
42. Keeton, Products Liability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REV. 131, 141 
(1972). 
43. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478-479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420. 
44. Langone, Gone Today, Hair Tomorrow, TIME, Aug. 29, 1988, at 78. 
45. Roberts, Questions Raised About Anti- Wrinkle Cream, SCIENCE, Feb. 5, 1988, at 
564. 
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that "harm to some users from prescription drugs IS 
unavoidable. "46 
The court's distinction based on the "unavoidability" of 
harm is not relevant to the issue of liability for design defects in 
prescription drugs. There is a difference between harm caused 
by design defects as compared to harm caused by other adverse 
drug reactions; Harm to some users of prescription drugs may 
indeed be unavoidable if the harm resulted from idiosincratic re-
actions or side effects of the drug which could not be anticipated 
by the manufacturer.47 In contrast, if the harm is caused by a 
design defect in the drug itself the harm was avoidable because a 
safer alternative design was available. Therefore, by definition, 
harm caused by a design defect cannot be "unavoidable." 
The court's attempt to distinguish prescription drugs from 
other products, either on the basis of the type of benefit they 
confer or the avoidability of harm, is tenuous. The court's argu-
ment is circular: all prescription drugs should receive the protec-
tion which comment k grants to unavoidably unsafe products 
because prescription drugs are unavoidably unsafe. The court's 
reasoning makes it appear as if it first decided to exempt all pre-
scription drugs from strict liability, and then selected comment 
k as its vehicle to do so. Although the court has hung its hat on 
comment k, the comment fails to provide the support for which 
the Brown court searches to rest its policy based decision. 
C. THE COMMENT K CONTROVERSY 
1. The language of comment K 
Commentators have criticized comment k as being vague, 
46. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420. 
47. A product which causes harm due to its interaction with a person's body chemis-
try does not exclude it from strict liability design defect analysis. The interaction of the 
product with the body chemistry should be part of safety considerations inherent in the 
design of the product. Thus, strict liability for design defect was applicable to a tampon 
manufacturer. West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 831, 220 Cal. 
Rptr. 437 (1985). Plaintiff contracted toxic shock syndrome resulting from the use of a 
vaginal tampon manufactured by defendant. She received a judgment against the manu-
facturer based on a strict product liability design defect theory. The West v. Johnson & 
Johnson decision will presumably not be affected by Brown because it involved a non-
prescription device. 
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obscure or even meaningless.48 The Brown court conceded it is 
unclear whether comment k grants blanket immunity from strict 
liability to all prescription drugs or just to those that are un-
avoidably dangerous.49 Despite this uncertainty, the court 
stated, "[n]evertheless, we are of the view that the comment was 
intended and should apply to all prescription drugs ... [A]lmost 
all jurisdictions that have adopted the rule stated in the com-
ment view its provisions as granting immunity from strict liabil-
ity to all such drugs."5o 
The court's interpretation and application of comment k on 
the basis of other states' holdings is without merit. "The Brown 
court overlooked the mountain of decisions that limit comment 
k to drugs that are in fact 'unavoidably unsafe'. . . and relied 
instead on a handful of decisions that did not address the issue, 
let alone resolve it in the manner Brown purported to follow."51 
48. See, e.g., Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and For 
Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 853 (1983); Twerski, National Product Liability 
Legislation: In Search for the Best of All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 411, 430 
(1982). 
49. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069 n.ll, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424. 
50. Id. at 1069 n.ll, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424. 
51. Brief for Appellants at 46, White v. Wyeth, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E. 2d 748 
(1988)(No. 87-1657). 
Appellants in White u. Wyeth analyzed the cases cited by the Brown court: In three 
of the cases cited in Brown, the court held only that the evidence established the partic-
ular drug was unavoidably unsafe. See DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 
222, 229 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[t]he evidence in this case points to Talwin being an unavoid-
ably unsafe product."); Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301, 
1302 (Ala. 1984) (plaintiffs presented no facts that the drug was unavoidably unsafe); 
Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326, 338-41 (Ariz. 1987) (reviewing evidence to 
determine balance of risks and benefits). 
In Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425-426 (2nd Cir. 1969) (applying 
Connecticut law), although the court relied on comment k, its discussion of the issue 
suggests that it understood Connecticut not to generally recognize a cause of action for 
strict liability design defect. Id. at n.12. 
In Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F.Supp. 377, 380-381 (D. Md. 1975) aff'd, 567 
F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) (applying District of Columbia law), the court appeared to deal 
with a failure to warn issue rather than a design defect claim. Brief for Appellants at 46-
47, n.39, White v. Wyeth, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E. 2d 748 (1988)(No. 87-1657). 
In Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 447 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1984) 
the court held only that the vaccine Orimune was an unavoidably unsafe product, not 
that all prescription drugs and vaccines are unavoidably unsafe. Johnson, 239 Kan. at 
285-286, 447 So. 2d at 1323-1324. Subsequently, in Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781-782 (1988), the Rhode Island Supreme Court cited Johnson to 
stand for the proposition that the question of whether a prescription drug is unavoidably 
unsafe is a ruling which the court allows the judge to make as a matter of law. Cas-
trignano, 546 A.2d at 781-782. Obviously, this is contrary to the Brown court's use of 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that those decisions of other states 
gave all prescription drugs the protection of comment k, if the 
Brown court were truly persuaded by the decisions of other ju-
risdictionsll2 it should have not simply followed their holdings 
but, more important, it should have been persuaded by their 
reasoning. Yet, as the Brown court itself noted, most cases which 
have embraced the rule of comment k have not given much con-
sideration to its language.1I3 Thus, these cases offer little reason-
ing which might assist in the interpretation and application of 
comment k. The Kearl court summarized this problem stating, 
[a]1though ... the rule against subjecting some 
special products to strict liability design defect 
analysis is well established, its application has not 
often been well explained. Instead, the rule is fre-
quently stated in conclusory fashion accompanied 
by little more than a reference or citation to Re-
statement Second of Torts section 402A, com-
ment k, which sets out the basic rule.~· 
"The statement that drugs are unavoidably unsafe, and there-
fore within the protection of comment k, has become almost tau-
tological. "1111 The decisions of other jurisdictions, then, do little 
to provide the Brown court a rationale for its interpretation and 
application of comment k. 
2. The interpretation and application of comment k by other 
state supreme courts 
Supreme court decisions in other states have challenged this 
routine application of comment k to all prescription drugs.1I6 
Johnson as support for the proposition that comment k exempts all prescription drugs 
from strict liability design defect analysis. 
52. The Brown court's list of cases contains primarily district and appellate cita-
tions. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1059-1060, 751 P.2d at 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417-418. It 
includes only two state supreme court decisions, Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Labora-
tories, 447 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1984) and Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 
279, 718 P.2d 1328 (Kan. 1986). Neither state supreme court decision holds that com-
ment k protects all prescription drugs from design defect analysis. See supra note 51. 
53. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1060, 751 P.2d 470, 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418 (1988). 
54. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 828, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463 
(1985). 
55. Note, Can A Prescription Drug Be Defectiuely Designed? Brochu u. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 247, 254 (1981). 
56. Seven state supreme courts have explicitly determined that not all prescription 
drugs should receive the protection of comment k: 
12
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These courts have refused to give prescription drug manufactur-
ers blanket immunity from strict liability design defects. 57 In-
stead, they have held that the question as to whether a drug is 
unavoidably unsafe should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 58 
In order for a prescription drug to receive the protection of com-
ment k, the scale must clearly tip in favor of benefits.59 
The Idaho Supreme Court stated the rationale of a case-by-
case analysis: a rule providing blanket immunity to prescription 
drugs from strict liability design defect analysis without requir-
ing a showing that comment k applies "runs counter both to the 
express language of comment k and to common sense."60 That 
court explained, 
[w]e do not believe comment k was intended to 
provide nor should it provide all ethical drugs 
Colorado - Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986); Idaho -
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987); New Jersey - Feld-
man v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429,479 A.2d 374 (1984); Ohio - White v. Wyeth, 40 
Ohio St. 3d 390, 533 N.E. 2d 748 (1988); Oregon - Senn v. Wyeth, 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 
215 (1988); Rhode Island - Castrignano v. E.R Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (RI. 
1988); Wisconsin - Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984). 
In addition, a Kansas state Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. American Cyana-
mid, 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986), has been interpreted as holding likewise. See 
supra, note 51. 
Two state supreme courts might be interpreted as exempting all prescription drugs 
from strict liability design defect analysis, although neither specifically discussed the is-
sue: Alabama - Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Ala. 
1984) ("[I]n the case of an 'unavoidably unsafe' yet properly prepared prescription drug, 
[footnote omitted] the adequacy of the accompanying warning determines whether the 
drug, as marketed, is defective, or unreasonably dangerous."); Nebraska - McDaniel v. 
McNeil Laboratories, 196 Nel>. 190, 201, 241 N.W.2d 822, 828 (1976) ("An unavoidably 
unsafe drug approved for marketing by the United States Food and Drug Administration 
... as a matter of law, is not defective nor unreasonably dangerous ... "). 
57. See supra note 56. 
58. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 415-416 (Colo. 1986); 
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 340, 732 P.2d 297, 309 (1987); White v. 
Wyeth, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 395, 533 N.E. 2d 748, 752 (1989); Senn v. Merrell-Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215, 218 n.4, (1988); Feldman v. Lederle Labora-
tories, 97 N.J. 429, 447, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (1984); Castrignano v. E.R Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (1988). 
59. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981). 
Plaintiffs were a husband and wife who brought action against the manufacturer of oral 
contraceptives to recover for damages the woman sustained from taking the drug. The 
court held that the manufacturer could be held liable for a design defect in the drug. 
60. Toner, 112 Idaho at 340, n.10, 732 P.2d at 309. Plaintiffs were parents of a child 
who was permanently paralyzed from the waist down resulting from a vaccination. The 
court analyzed comment k and determined that not all prescription drugs should receive 
its protection. 
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with blanket immunity from strict liability design 
defects claims. The comment refers to 'some' 
products which are unavoidably unsafe; ... Obvi-
ously, the comment does not apply to all drugs. 
Rather the comment applies 'when the product is 
unavoidably unsafe,' ... It is equally obvious that 
not all drugs are so perfectly designed that they 
cannot be made more pure or more safe, or that 
there are not safer, suitable alternatives; nor do 
the benefits of all drugs necessarily outweigh their 
risks.61 
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated, "we see no rea-
son to hold as matter of law and policy that all prescription 
drugs that are unsafe are unavoidably so. Drugs, like any other 
products, may contain defects that could have been avoided by 
better manufacturing or design. "62 The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court has refused to adopt comment k because it "is too restric-
tive and, therefore, not commensurate with strict products lia-
bility law in Wisconsin."63 
Four months after Brown, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
considered the issue of whether all prescription drugs should re-
ceive the protection of comment k. Having the benefit of the 
reasoning of each of the supreme court decisions discussed, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected Brown stating, 
"[a]lthough both approaches have merit, we believe the societal 
interest in ensuring the development and marketing of prescrip-
61. [d. at 339, 732 P.2d at 308. 
62. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 447, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (1984). 
Plaintiff suffered tooth discoloration caused by taking a tetracycline drug and brought a 
strict liability action against the manufacturer for failing to warn the physician about the 
drug's side effects. The court held that whether a prescription drug is unavoidably un-
safe should be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
63. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 197, 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (1984). Plaintiff 
claimed injuries from her mother's ingestion of DES while plaintiff was in utero. The 
court permitted her to proceed under a strict products liability cause of action. To pre-
vail on this theory, the plaintiff had to prove: (1) DES was defective when it left the 
possession or control of the drug company; (2) that DES was unreasonably dangerous to 
the user or consumer; (3) that the defect was a cause of the plaintiff's injury; (4) that the 
drug company engaged in the business of producing or marketing DES; and (5) that the 
product was one which the company expected to reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition it was when sold. Id., 116 Wis. 2d at 195-196, 342 
N.W.2d at 51. 
See also David, DTP: Drug Manufacturers' Liability, 9 J. PROD. LIAB. 361, 396-397 
(1986) which adopts the view that comment k does not provide blanket immunity for all 
prescription drugs. 
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tion drugs will be adequately served by extending the protection 
to prescription drugs on a case-by-case basis."64 Most recently 
the Ohio Supreme Court held that whether a prescription drug 
"qualifies as 'unavoidably unsafe' under Comment k is a deter-
mination to be made on a case-by-case basis."61i The Ohio Su-
preme Court explained, "[I]t is ... obvious that not all drugs are 
so perfectly designed that they cannot be made more pure or 
more safe, or that there are not safer, suitable alternatives; nor 
do the benefits of all drugs necessarily outweigh their risks. "66 
Thus, those state Supreme Courts faced with the issue of 
whether prescription drugs should be afforded blanket immunity 
from strict liability have opted for a case-by-case analysis. 
3. The interpretation and application of comment K by Cali-
fornia appellate courts 
The Brown court also referred to three California appellate 
court decisions which have applied comment k.67 The court ap-
parently cited these appellate decisions to bolster its interpreta-
tion and application of comment k.68 
First, the court referred to Carmichael v. Reitz.6D However, 
Carmichael does not support the court's interpretation of com-
ment k. This is evidenced by Flood v. Wyeth70 which was de-
64. Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (1988). Plaintiff 
sought to recover for injuries incurred in utero by mother's ingestion of DES. The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court certified three questions concerning injuries caused by prescrip-
tion drugs: (1) Does the State of Rhode Island recognize an action for damages for per-
sonal injuries in the circumstances presented in that case based on theories of strict 
liability in tort and breach of warranty of merchantability? (2) Does comment k to sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement of Torts apply in Rhode Island to an action for damages 
for personal injuries in the circumstances presented in that action based upon strict lia-
bility? (3) If comment k applies to that type of action, is its application to DES a matter 
of law or a question of fact, and, if a question of fact, which party has the burden of 
proof? [d. at 776-777. 
65. White v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 395, 533 N.E.2d 748, 752 
(1989). 
66. [d. at 395, 533 N.E. 2d at 752 (citing Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 
328, 339, 732 P.2d 297, 308 (1987)). 
67. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1059-1060, 751 P.2d 470, 476, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 412, 417-418 (1988). 
68. [d. at 1059-1060, 751 P.2d at 476, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417-418. 
69. 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971). 
70. Flood v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 228 Cal. Rptr. 700 
(1986). 
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cided in the same district, fifteen years after Carmichael.7I The 
Flood court recognized a strict liability cause of action for a vac-
cine and held the statutory scheme requiring immunization for 
all school-aged children did not grant immunity to vaccine man-
ufacturers.72 The Flood court, in fact, looked to Kearl v. Lederle 
Laboratories73 in reaching its decision and cited Kearl's holding 
that "[m]anufacturers of vaccines are subject to liability under a 
strict products liability design defect theory, unless the trial 
court makes certain evidentiary findings. 1I74 The California Su-
preme Court denied the manufacturer's petition for review in 
Flood.7 " Flood, then, appears to stand for the proposition that 
prescription drugs can be subject to design defect analysis. 
The other two California appellate cases cited by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court as illustrative of courts which have 
adopted comment k, Christofferson v. Kaiser76 and Toole v. 
Richardson," dealt with the application of strict liability in the 
context of a duty to warn. Neither stood for the proposition that 
all prescription drugs should be protected by comment k. This is 
apparent from the later Kearl decision78 (14 years after Chris-
tofferson and 18 years after Toole) which was decided in the 
same district as both of these cases. Because Kearl made no 
mention of breaking with precedent, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the Kearl court believed itself to be consistent with these 
previous decisions. 
The Brown court is correct in stating that these courts ap-
plied comment k.79 The comment, however, was not understood 
as exempting all prescription drugs from a strict liability design 
defect analysis. These cases do not bolster the Brown court's de-
cision to protect all prescription drugs from strict liability design 
defect analysis. 
71. Carmichael, 17 Cal. Apr,>. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971). 
72. Flood, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1275, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 701. 
73. [d. at 1276, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 702 (citing Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. 
App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985)). 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 1280, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 700. 
76. Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 
825 (1971). 
77. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). 
78. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985). 
79. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1059-1060,751 P.2d 470, 476, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 412, 417-418 (1988). 
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In summary, the Brown court's interpretation of comment k 
apparently was not gleaned from the ambiguous language of the 
comment, the rationale of other jurisdictions or its prior applica-
tion in California. Further, state supreme courts which have spe-
cifically considered the issue as to whether comment k should 
exempt all prescription drugs from design defect analysis have 
held contrary to Brown. 
D. THE KEARL TEST: BALANCING CONSUMER PROTECTION WITH 
MANUFACTURER LIABILITY 
1. A case-by-case "Kearl analysis" relieves the injured plain-
tiff of two evidentiary burdens 
One of the purposes behind the strict product liability doc-
trine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of evidentiary burdens in-
herent in a negligence cause of action.80 Application of a Kearl 
analysis would effectuate this public policy .. 
First, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case showing 
that the drug's design was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injury, the burden of proof shifts to the manufacturer81 who 
would have the burden of showing that the drug is unavoidably 
unsafe and, thus, should receive the protection of comment k.82 
Comment k, then, would be an affirmative defense to a claim 
based on strict liability.83 As a matter of policy, the burden of 
proving the status of the knowledge at the time of distribution 
should be placed on the manufacturer since it is in a superior 
position to know the technological information in the particular 
field. 84 The drug manufacturer could use the criteria set forth in 
Kearl to prove that the product is entitled to comment k protec-
tion. If the manufacturer is able to sustain its burden of proof 
80. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-432, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978). Plaintiff was injured while operating a piece of heavy con-
struction equipment and claimed that a safety device would have prevented the accident. 
The court found that the defendant could be held liable for a defect in design. The court 
held that the once the plaintiff proves that a product's design was the proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injury, the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the utility of 
the product outweighs the danger. [d. 
81. [d. 
82. Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho at 328, 338, 732 P.2d 297, 307 (1987). 
83. [d. at 339, 732 P.2d at 308. 
84. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 455-456, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984). 
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that the drug is unavoidably unsafe, the plaintiff cannot proceed 
on a strict liability cause of action. Second, if the manufacturer 
cannot prove that its product should receive the protection of 
comment k, the plaintiff can proceed on a strict liability cause of 
action and the drug would be treated like other products to 
which strict liability applies. Assuming the plaintiff has made 
out a prima facie showing that the product's design was the 
proximate cause of his/her injury, the burden of proof would 
shift to the defendant to prove that the product is not 
defective.85 
2. The Kearl test would not cause drug manufacturers to stop 
the development of needed drugs 
The Kearl test was unacceptable to the Brown court be-
cause drug manufacturers would not know whether a particular 
drug would be judged as conferring an exceptional benefit to re-
ceive the protection of comment k.86 The court felt that this po-
tential exposure to greater liability would diminish a manufac-
turer's incentive to develop and distribute new drugs.87 The 
concern that tighter reigns of liability on drug manufacturers 
would impede development of new drugs or cause bankruptcy 
has been rejected by other courtS.88 In 1960, a drug manufac-
turer unsuccessfully argued that public policy will best be served 
by denying recovery in warranty for "new drugs" because devel-
opment of medicines will be retarded if manufacturers are held 
to strict liability for their defects.89 Similarly, an Illinois court 
rejected an argument by drug manufacturers that a market 
share theory would render pharmaceutical companies uninsur-
able, and thus unable to absorb the costs of liability, stating, 
"[t]hese economic considerations have arisen where courts have 
contemplated any expansion of products liability law."90 
85. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-432, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978). 
86. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1067,751 P.2d 470, 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. 
412, 423 (1988). 
87. [d. at 1067-1068, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423. 
88. See infra notes 89 and 90. 
89. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 611-612, 6 Cal. Rptr. 
320, 326 (1960). Plaintiff prevailed in an action based on a breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability against the manufacturer of a Salk vaccine. Plaintiffs contracted polio-
myelitis after being inoculated with the vaccine. [d. at 605, 612, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 322, 326. 
90. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333, 349 (1988). Plaintiff was a DES daugh-
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"[D]rug manufacturers are· not nonprofit or charitable insti-
tutions. They are commercial profit-making enterprises ... "91 
Drug manufacturers are in the business of developing and pro-
moting new drugs and, as in any other enterprise, it pays to pro-
duce new products.92 Drug manufacturers are in competition 
with one another, just as any other industry. Therefore, they 
must search for and develop new drugs to stay in business.93 
This concept is more than just academic rhetoric. Merck, a drug 
manufacturer which has emerged as the leader in new drug de-
velopment,94 was ranked number one as the most admired com-
pany in 1986, 1987 and 1988.911 "I think Merck is a very competi-
tive company, and I push our people to be competitive ... we 
challenge people to get into new fields, and we tell them that the 
objective is to make a drug, not just to discover facts and pub-
lish in trade journals. "96 
Of course, a desire to remain competitive and produce new 
ter who brought an action against manufacturers who produced DES. 
91. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 444, 479 A.2d 374, 382 (1984). See 
e.g., STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H 16. "Earnings 
. of many leading pharmaceutical companies have also benefited from extensive corporate 
restructuring programs, which have involved the divestiture of unprofitable or marginal 
non-drug businesses and stressed investment in high-profit drug operations." Id. 
92. Selker, An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Re-
sponsibility for Drug-related Injuries under Comment k to Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, 23 DUQ. LAW REV. 199, 216 (1984). Drug manufacturers rely on 
research and development as the key to future growth. STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY 
SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H 19. Drug patent laws should also encourage 
continued development of new drugs. New prescription drugs generally receive a patent 
for 17 years. After the patent expires, generic drugs may enter the market for that drug. 
Generic drugs are copies of established brand-name drugs whose patent lives have ex-
pired. Prices for generic drugs are less than the original brand name drugs because there 
is no need to recoup costs such as research and development, FDA approval and adver-
tising. STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H 22. Conse-
quently, drug manufacturers must continue to come up with new drugs because they 
cannot rely on continuing large profits from older drugs once the patents expire and 
competitive prices enter the market. 
93. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 
RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 1017 (1964). 
94. STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H20. 
95. Davenport, America's Most Admired Corporations, FORTUNE, Jan. 30, 1989, a~ 
68. 
96. Schultz, America's Most Admired Corporations, Fortune, Jan. 18, 1988, at 38. 
"Merck's ambitious research and development program spawm~d an unprecedented list 
of new drug products, which are now beginning to be translated into sales and profits ... 
By the end of this decade, the drugs mentioned above could generate over $1 billion in 
new revenues for Merck." STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No. 
1 at H20. 
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drugs is not enough. It must also be financially feasible for drug 
manufacturers to absorb increased insurance costs which may 
result from potential litigation. Statistics indicate that drug 
manufacturers have the necessary financial resources.B7 Sixteen 
pharmaceutical companies are ranked in the top 500 companies 
in the United States.BS The industry median for pharmaceutical 
companies in 1986 for return to investors was 27.90%.99 Net in-
come rose as high as $779 million. loo Overall profits increased 
20.3% from the previous year. IOI It has been said that "[i]f ever 
there were an industry which could easily withstand the impact 
of liability ... it is the drug industry."lo2 
Finally, the Brown court's belief that the development of 
new drugs will be facilitated by holding drug manufacturers to a 
97. American Cyanamid Co., a drug manufacturer, discussed the financial impact 
of lawsuits on the company in its 1984 annual report. 
The company and its subsidiaries are parties to numerous 
suits and claims arising out of the conduct of the business. 
Included among such suits are approximately sixty-six involv-
ing personal injury occurring in connection with administra-
tion of the company's DPT and oral polio vaccines; these vac-
cines involve very large damage claims, including claims for 
punitive damages in many cases. In the opinion of manage-
ment, the ultimate liability resulting from all pending suits 
and claims (after taking into account insurance coverage) will 
not have a material adverse effect upon the consolidated fi-
nancial position of the company or its subsidiaries. 
American Cyanamid Annual Report, 1984, page 39. 
98. Who did best and worst among the 500, FORTUNE, Apr. 27, 1987, at 404. 
99. Id. at 384. In this "return to investors" category, pharmaceuticals ranked num-
ber six out of twenty-five industries. The return ranged from a low of -9.50% in metals 
to a high of 48.74 % in tobacco. The industry breakdowns are as follows: tobacco 48. 74%, 
rubber products 38.5%, food 36.50%, textiles 35.96%, forest products 30.88%, 
pharmaceuticals 27.90%, scientific and photo equipment 22.87%, chemicals 21.84%, 
metal products 21.73%, apparel 21.51 %, furniture 17.83%, soaps, cosmetics 16.67%, bev-
erages 16.37%, computers and office equipment 14.64%, publishing, printing 14.47%, 
building materials 14.07%, transportation equipment 9.32%, industrial and farm equip-
ment 7.33%, electronics 6.55%, motor vehicles and parts 5.16%, petroleum refining 
4.00%, aerospace -.04%, mining -.51 %, toys, sporting goods -1.11 %, metals -9.50%. Id. 
In the "return on stockholder's equity" category, the pharmaceutical industry emerged 
as the leader with an median of 23.6% followed by the tobacco industry with a median of 
22.1 %. The low in this category was the toy, sporting goods industry with a median of 
.3%. Id. at 385. 
100. Id. at 404. Also, Abbott Laboratories reported record sales and profits for the 
second quarter of 1987. Net income for the period rose to $155.1 million, from $133.7 
million in the year-earlier period. Chicago Tribune, July 10, 1987, § 3, at 2, col. 1. 
101. I d. at at 386. 
102. Note, Strict Liability in Tort: Its Applicability to Manufacturers of Prescrip-
tion Drugs, 7 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 508 (1974). 
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lesser standard of liability is unrealistic because most drug man-
ufacturers distribute nationwide, including those states which 
have held that prescription drugs are not automatically ex-
empted from strict liability design defect analysis. l03 Conse-
quently, in the development of new drugs, manufacturers must 
not only consider liability under California law, but also the 
tighter reins of liability in other states.10", 
3. The Kearl test would not cause a delay in marketing new 
drugs that confer exceptional benefits 
There are some drugs which should get to the consuming 
public quickly. But that is why it is necessary to analyze each 
new drug on a case-by-case basis. If there were exigent circum-
stances or the drug was to confer an exceptional benefit, the 
Kearl test would not subject a drug manufacturer to a strict lia-
bility standard. l05 
In contrast, speed is less important in cases where the drug 
does not confer an exceptional benefit. For example, the public 
can wait longer for prescription drugs which are primarily cos-
metic, if additional testing might ensure greater safety. 
4. Insurance costs for high risk drugs 
The Brown court cited several examples of drugs that had 
to be taken off the market (or could not be put on the market) 
because of the inability to obtain liability insurance at a reason-
able cost.106 The court stated, "[w]e express no opinion whether 
the products to which these examples relate were in fact benefi-
cial to the public health."l07 It is absurd not to consider this fac-
tor since obtaining insurance is a way of allocating risk and if a 
product is uninsurable, that implies a high risk. In a high risk 
103. See supra note 56. 
104. Id. 
105. Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829-830, 218 Cal. Rptr. 
453, 463-464 (1985). 
106. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064-1065, 751 P.2d 470, 479-480, 
245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 421 (1988). The court gave examples of an influenza vaccine, a diph-
theria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine, a new drug for treatment of vision problems, and an 
anti-~auseant drug, Bendectin. 
107. Id. at 1065 n.10, 751 P.2d at 480, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421. 
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situation, the manufacturer should then consider how high a 
benefit the drug is intended to confer. Even more absurd is that 
the court gave Bendectin, an anti-nauseant drug for pregnant 
women, as an example of a drug that had to be removed from 
the market because the cost of insurance almost equalled the 
entire income from the sale of the drug. lOB Bendectin has been 
associated with limb deformities and other congenital defects in 
children of mothers who took the drug. lo9 The example of 
Bendectin, rather than supporting the court's proposition, in-
stead illustrates one of the goals of adopting the Kearl test: 
when the risk becomes so high that the drug is difficult to in-
sure, it forces the manufacturer to consider whether an anti-nau-
seant drug such as Bendectin is conferring an especially impor-
tant benefit. If not, the drug should be removed from the 
market. 
The Brown court gave an example of a situation in which a 
manufacturer was unable to market a new drug to treat vision 
problems because it could not obtain adequate insurance. llo This 
illustration is misleading, however, because the drug, Oculinum, 
is an experimental one and has not been licensed by the FDA.1l1 
The FDA does not allow patients to be charged for experimental 
drugs whose value has not been firmly proven.112 Naturally, the 
situation is greatly altered when a drug cannot be charged for 
because the principle of risk distribution is not applicable. That 
is, the cost of insurance cannot be spread to the consuming pub-
lic. This is obviously different from the profit-making drug man-
ufacturer who may spread the cost of insurance to consumers of 
the drug. 
108. Id. at 1064, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421. 
109. Selker, An Escape from Strict Liability: Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Re-
sponsibility for Drug-related Injuries under Comment k to Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, 23 DUQ. LAW REV. 199, n.4 (1984). 
110. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1065, 751 P.2d 470, 480, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 412, 421 (1988). 
111. The drug is made from botulinum, the same toxin that poisons improperly 
canned food. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1986, at C1, col. 3. 
112. Dr. Alan B. Scott, a proponent of Oculinum, sought permission to charge for 
the drug so he could pay for his insurance. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1986, at C1, col. 3. 
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5. The price of prescription drugs will still be affordable to 
the consuming public 
The Brown court gave two examples of dramatic price in-
creases, one case involving a vaccine and the other, a prescrip-
tion drug.113 
Although drug price inflation exceeds the overall inflation 
rate,114 the example of Bendectinlltl cited by the court is extreme 
and atypical of the general price increases of prescription drugs. 
The average prescription cost increased 4.6% from 1985 to 1986 
and the average actual cost increased from $9.73 to $10.18.116 
One survey estimated that, for persons using prescription drugs, 
the average annual expenditure for those under sixty-five was 
$46 per person and for those over sixty-five, $93 per person. ll7 
113. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1064-1065, 751 P.2d at 479, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 421. 
114. STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H 18. The 
overall consumer price index rose 1.9% in 1986. Medical care rose 7.5%. Id. at H 15. 
During the same year, the average wholesale price for prescription drugs rose by 8.7%. 
Budiansky, The cost of new drugs raises the roof, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Apr. 6, 
1987, at 47. 
115. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064, 751 P.2d 470, 479, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 412, 421 (1988). The price of Bendectin rose 300% before it was removed from the 
market. Id. The actual cost went from 30 cents per tablet to $1.00 per tablet. Lawsuits 
Kill Off a Pregnancy Drug, CHEMICAL WEEK, June 22, 1983, at 14. Bendectin, as a preg-
nancy prescription drug, is different than many prescription drugs. First, it is reasonable 
to expect that any drug taken by a pregnant woman may affect the fetus and insurance 
companies are legitimately fearful about insuring such drugs. Second, even though $1.00 
per tablet is expensive, the drug was to be taken only on a temporary basis to prevent 
nausea. 
116. STANDARD & POORS INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H20. As of 
November 1986, selected prescription drug groups showed the following year-to· year in-
creases: analgesics, 13.0%; antiarthritics, 11.2%; systemic anti·infectives, 6.4%; antispas-
modic/anti secretory, 12.1 %; bronchial therapy, 13.6%; cancer therapy, 6.9%; cardiovas-
cular, 11.5%; central nervous system stimulants, 25.8%; contraceptives, 13.3%, cough 
and cold preparations, 8.7%; and dermatological preparations, 2.8%. Id. at H 19. 
The following reflect price increases of prescription drugs as compared to all other 
consumer goods between 1981 and 1986 (ratio represented by prescription drugs:all other 
products): 1981 11.7%:10.4%, 1982 11.0%:6.1%, 1983 10.5%:3.2%, 1984 9.5%: 4.3%, 
1985 9.1 %:3.6%, 1986 8.7%:1.9%. Budiansky, The Cost of New Drugs Raises the Roof, 
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Apr. 6, 1987, at 47. 
117. PMA Statistical Factbook, 1986 at 2-9 to 2-10. The statistics for this study 
were gathered in 1977. Id. A later study was done in 1980 but statistics were reported on 
a per capita basis rather than the "average charge per user" that the 1977 study re-
flected. Per capita charges are averaged over all persons in the population, whether they 
used prescription drugs or not, and thus are lower than average charges per user. That 
study showed that the per capita cost for prescription drugs was $35 in 1980. Costs of 
Illness United States, 1980, National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Survey, 
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The Brown court also used the cost and the predicted 
shortage of the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DPT) vaccine1l8 to 
illustrate its point.1l9 The vaccine rose in cost from 11 cents in 
1982 to $11.40 in 1986.120 This is a drastic increase, but it is not 
representative of typical price increases in prescription drugs. 
The Brown court cannot reasonably draw inferences about the 
cost of prescription drugs based on vaccine statistics because 
they are not analogous situations. This is evidenced by legisla-
tive intervention to deal specifically with problems of liability 
and compensation for vaccine injuries.121 In contrast, Congress 
has not found it necessary to intervene in the area of prescrip-
tion drugs. 
Rising costs are not limited to the pharmaceutical indus-
try.122 Even outside the pharmaceutical industry, there has been 
a surge of product related lawsuits.123 "Premiums paid by com-
panies for protection against product-related litigation have 
been soaring-and in the last year alone, increases of 300% or 
more have not been uncommon. "124 Difficulties faced by phar-
maceutical companies in obtaining insurance at a reasonable 
cost is not unique to that industry, but is a problem faced by 
page 7. 
Rising costs of prescription drugs may present a genuine hardship to the elderly. 
People over 65 consume about 30% of all prescription drugs. The Big Lie About Generic 
Drugs, CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1987, at 480. It is important to ensure the availability 
of prescription drugs to these people. A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of 
this article except to note some available alternatives. Many prescription drugs are avail-
able in generic form. [d. at 481-482. Brand names cost 70% more than generics. [d. at 
481. 
118. The pertussis component of DPT is made from the whole Bordetella pertussis 
bacterium. The bacterium contain two toxins which are suspected of causing adverse 
effects on the central nervous system. White v. Wyeth, 40 Ohio St. 3d 390, 391, 533 
N.E.2d 748, 749 (1988). 
119. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064-1065, 751 P.2d 470, 479-480, 
245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 421 (1988). 
120. [d. 
121. In 1986 Congress passed and the President signed into law the National Child-
hood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-660, Title III, Section 2101-2128, 100 Stat. 
3755-84, 42 U.S.C. Section aa-l et seq, amended by the Vaccine Compensation Amend-
ments of 1987, P.L. 100-203, 133 Congo Rec. H 12103, at 12166 (Dec. 21, 1987). In the 
Act, Congress created a "no-fault'" compensation system to assure children injured by 
vaccines could secure recovery. 
122. The Sue Syndrome, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1977, at 61-62. 
123. [d. The cause and cure for this trend are beyond the scope of this article. For 
detailed analysis, see 5 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH), 623-638 app. G. 
124. The Sue Syndrome, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1977, at 61-62. 
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other industries as well. 125 As long as pharmaceutical products 
are still available and affordable, it is unreasonable to draw an 
artificial line at the boundaries of prescription drugs. 
Finally, the threat that drug manufacturers may face a 
stricter standard will encourage greater honesty and a faster re-
sponse in removing a drug from the market if it is discovered 
that the drug is potentially defective~ Drug manufacturers must 
recoup their investments quickly because of the threat that a 
competitor may produce a superior drug. 126 Consequently, once 
a drug has been released, there is incentive for manufacturers to 
suppress adverse information and delay FDA regulatory ac-
tion.127 However, in a strict liability design defect analysis, the 
focus is on the product, not the manufacturer's standard of care. 
A manufacturer's incentive to continue marketing a potentially 
defective drug is, therefore, diminished because the issue will be 
whether the product was defective, not whether the manufac-
turer was negligent. 
E. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: CODIFICATION OF A Kearl TYPE 
ANALYSIS 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once stated, "it must be 
remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liber-
ties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the 
125. [d. 
126. Comment, Drug Product Liability and Health Care Delivery Systems, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 989, 1017 (1988). Moving a drug from the initial discovery stage through FDA 
approval can take from seven to ten years and cost over $100 million. STANDARD & POORS 
INDUSTRY SURVEYS, April 1988, Volume No.1 at H 19. 
127. [d. at 1017, n.113. There are several examples of drug manufacturers' "slow 
reflex time" in removing drugs from the market. In 1969, Upjohn challenged an FDA 
order removing the combination antibiotic Pan alba from the market. Upjohn earned $1.5 
million per month from Panalba sales until the court affirmed FDA's order several 
months later. Id. at 1017, n.113 (citing S. Greenberg, THE QUALITY OF MERCY 269, at 273-
74 (1971». "Despite conclusive evidence of the drug's danger and the fact that it was 
superior to other antibiotics in only a handful of emergencies, Parke-Davis downplayec! 
the drug's toxicity so effectively that ten years after the discovery of its adverse effects, 
Chlormycetin was being prescribed wrongly in about 90% of cases ... " [d. at 1018, n.118 
(citing M. Silverman and P. Lee, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS at 59-61, 283-88 (1974». 
In marketing MER/29, "Richardson-Merrell falsified results of animal tests, withheld 
negative outside reports, prepared 'scientific papers' signed by 'independent' investiga-
tors, and bribed physicians not to criticize the drug." [d. at 1019, n.127 (citing M. 
Silverman and P. Lee, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS at 89-94). 
25
Brodie: Products Liability
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989
460 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:435 
courts. "128 The Brown decision may be an appropriate occasion 
for the California legislature to intervene and exercise its 
"guardian" role. A possible solution to remedy the effect of 
Brown is that the legislature codify a Kearl type analysis. This 
will enable courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a 
prescription drug is unavoidably unsafe and entitled to exemp-
tion from strict liability design defect analysis. The following is 
a suggested model statute:129 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) below, a 
manufacturer of an FDA-approved prescription 
drug that is sold, delivered, administered or dis-
pensed in California shall be held strictly liable 
for all damages proximately or legally caused by a 
design defect in the drug. 
(2) A manufacturer of an FDA-approved prescrip-
tion drug that is sold, delivered, administered or 
dispensed in California shall not be held liable for 
any damages proximately or legally caused by a 
design defect in the drug if the trial judge deter-
mines that the drug is unavoidably unsafe. A pre-
scription drug is unavoidably unsafe if the trial 
judge determines that each of the criteria set 
forth in (A), (B) and (C) below are conjunctively 
met. 
(A) The drug was intended to confer an ex-
ceptionally important health benefit on soci-
ety that made its availability highly 
desirable. 
(B) The risk posed by the product was both 
substantial and unavoidable. 
(i) In deciding whether the risk posed 
was substantial as stated in section 
(2)(B), a court should consider 
whether, at the time of distribution, 
the risk posed permanent or long-term 
disability (e.g. loss of body functions, 
organs, or death) as opposed to tempo-
rary inconvenience (e.g. skin rash). 
(ii) In deciding whether the risk posed 
128. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270,48 L.Ed. 971, 973, 24 S.Ct. 
638 (1904). 
129. The language of this model statute is taken primarily from the test set forth in 
Kear! v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829-830, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 463-464 
(1985). 
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was unavoidable as stated in section 
(2)(B) a court should consider: 
(a) If the product design mini-
mized risks inherent in the prod-
uct, and 
(b) The availability of any alter-
native product that would have as 
effectively accomplished the full 
intended purpose of the product. 
(C) The interest in availability of the pre-
scription drug outweighs the interest in pro-
moting enhanced accountability through 
strict liability design defect review. 
(3) The trial court shall rule as a matter of law130 
as to whether a prescription drug shall be consid-
ered unavoidably unsafe according to the criteria 
as set forth in section (2) above. 
(4) Each of the criteria (A), (B) and (C) above are 
to be determined as of the time the drug was 
distributed. 
(5) Nothing in this statute effects the liability of a 
manufacturer on issues pertaining to failure to 
warn. 
V. CONCLUSION 
461 
For over thirty years the California Supreme Court has pio-
neered the way of product liability law in seeking ways to pro-
vide a remedy to protect those injured by defective products. 
This consumer protection strand has guided the court to cut 
through the citadel of privity,l3l limitations of warranty,132 the 
130. Some courts have emphasized the factual determinations necessary and believe 
it is proper for the jury to decide whether a product is unavoidably unsafe. Toner v. 
Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 339, n.9, 732 P.2d 297, 308-309 (1987). Others con-
sider it a decision for the court to decide as a matter of law. [d. 
131. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Plaintiff 
was injured as a result of a defect in one of the wheels of an automobile. The issue of the 
case was whether the defendant manufacturer owed a duty of care to anyone but the 
immediate purchaser, the retailer. The court held that the manufacturer was liable to 
the plaintiff. 
132. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Plain-
tiff was injured when the steering gear of the automobile she was driving malfunctioned. 
[d. at 369, 161 A.2d at 75. The court held that the manufacturer's attempt to disclaim an 
implied warranty of merchantability was so harmful to the public good that it would be 
considered invalid. [d. at 408, 161 A.2d at 97. 
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burden of proof,133 and causation.134 The court's decision in 
Brown reflects a retreat from the its consumer protection orien-
tation and a diversion from the sentiments expressed in Sindell 
just eight years ago. At that time, the court stated that the con-
siderations underlying strict liability are "particularly significant 
where medication is involved, for the consumer is virtually help-
less to protect himself from serious, sometimes permanent, 
sometimes fatal, injuries caused by deleterious drugs."1311 
The public policies of availability and affordability of pre-
scription drugs are important, but they should not override the 
policies underlying strict liability. A Kearl type analysis fairly 
balances a drug manufacturer's liability with consumer protec-
tion by providing drug manufacturers an opportunity to escape a 
strict liability standard if a drug qualifies as "unavoidably un-
safe." Thus, this balance facilitates the aim that the obligation 
of the manufacturer will continue to be based upon "the de-
mands of social justice.m3e 
Terrie Bialostok Brodie * 
133. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431·432, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978). 
134. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 
(1980). Plaintiff could not identify which drug manufacturer produced the DES ingested 
by her mother. The court adopted the market share theory to deal with the impossibility 
plaintiff would otherwise have in establishing causation. 
135. [d. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. 
136. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69 (citing 
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 627, 135 P. 633, 635 (1913)). 
* Golden Gate University, Class of 1990. 
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